



Jurnal Minds: Manajemen Ide dan Inspirasi 
Vol. 8, No.2 (December) 2021: 255-268 
255 
 
*Corresponding Author : lince.bulutoding@uin-alauddin.ac.id   











AUDIT DELAY AND RISK MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE IN 
CAPITAL MARKET: SOME NEXUS CONSIDERATIONS 
Lince Bulutoding* 
Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar, Indonesia 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The reluctance of modern firms to disclose their risk management 
is often investigated; however, how it interacts with audit delay is still 
underrepresented in academic investigations. This article thus provides a 
glimpse of how profitability and leverage serve as predictors of audit delay and 
the risk management disclosure in Indonesia-listed firms, aside from managerial 
ownership as the moderating variable. A five-year market movement becomes 
the investigated data in a quantitative approach. The findings reveal that 
profitability and leverage are not related to risk management disclosure, but they 
affect audit delay and subsequently to the disclosure. Managerial ownership also 
boosts the relationships of the dependent variables. No Indirect relationships are 
reported. 






















The low level of awareness of risk management in Indonesia is seen from 
the lack of implementation of tools to prevent losses in the form of financial and 
non-financial risks. They are making investors and users of financial statements 
less confident in the completeness and reliability of accounting figures in the 
report (Patel & Chrisman, 2014). This study examines the effect of managerial 
ownership on risk management disclosure, the impact of public ownership on 
risk management disclosure, the impact of leverage on risk management 
disclosure, and the effect of firm size on risk management disclosure in 
companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Shareholders use financial statements to see a picture of the performance 
and changes in the company's financial position (White et al., 2010). Financial 
statement information is used as a basis for decision-making by both internal and 
external parties (Almazari, 2013). Financial statements do not only include 
information of a financial nature but also contain non-financial information. 
Investors need non-financial information in making investment-related 
decisions. Making investment decisions based on financial information without 
paying attention to non-financial information cannot be said to be the proper 
decision-making because investors do not know the company's actual value 
(Murphy, 2012). The number of fraud cases committed by companies in financial 
statements indicates that the level of awareness of risk management in companies 
in Indonesia is still low. This low awareness of risk management can be seen from 
the lack of implementation of tools to prevent losses in the form of financial and 
non-financial against the business risks faced (Alwi et al., 2021). This low 
awareness will make the company's survival immeasurable, which makes many 
companies go bankrupt or have problems. Some companies experiencing this 
problem have reduced the confidence of investors and users of financial 
statements in the completeness and reliability of accounting. Information in 
financial statements is very detrimental to many parties, such as manipulating 
financial statements that recently occurred at PT. Hanson International Tbk is a 
property company linked to the scandals of two state-owned companies PT 
Asuransi Jiwasraya (Persero) and PT Asabri (Persero). Although there are 
provisions for financial statement responsibility in the company law, its 
implementation in the field is still minimal. It is seen from the awareness of 
company leaders to prepare good financial reports is still lacking (Robbins & 
Judge, 2009).  
The standard of risk management implementation is measured by the 
Index Framework International Standards Organization Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2017). Company 
Jakarta Islamic Index reveals risk with a stagnant value of 75%. The position of 
the Risk Management Disclosure of the Jakarta Islamic Index is quite good. Still, 
it is necessary to increase risk disclosure because the implementation and 
management are not optimal. Based on the Risk Management Disclosure items, 
the most disclosed risk by the Jakarta Islamic Index (JII) company is the risk 
related to non-financial issues with 75 disclosures. In comparison, the remaining 
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33 disclosures are risks associated with financial problems (Elshandidy et al., 
2013). 
This research will focus on companies that display the risk identification 
process in the Indonesian capital market, especially those listed in JII. This study 
will fill in the lack of discourse on audit delay and risk management disclosure 
and the interaction of other predictor variables. This research will contribute to 
the mapping of important information related to the role of audit quality and 
public information disclosure in Indonesia. 
 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Agency Theory   
Agency theory was first coined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), with the 
argument that the agency relationship occurs when one or more people (Principal) 
hire another person (Agent) to provide a service and then delegate decision-
making authority. Agency theory assumes management as a rational individual, 
has self-interest, and seeks to maximize his self-interest. Managers as agents are 
responsible for optimizing shareholder profits. On the other hand, managers also 
are interested in maximizing their welfare e, so, likely, agents will not always act 
in the principal's best interests (Davis et al., 1997; Young et al., 2012). 
The difference in interests between shareholders and management can lead 
to a conflict called a conflict of interest. Conflicts of interest arise in agency theory 
when each party seeks to maximize profits for themselves. The principal wants a 
fast and considerable return on the investment invested in the company. In 
contrast, the agent wants his interests to be accommodated by providing adequate 
compensation or incentives for his performance. This difference in interests forces 
management to follow what the shareholders want to prepare financial statements 
that show the company's significant growth financially and non-financially(Lovell, 
2002; Patel & Chrisman, 2014). Complete information is known by management, 
and the administration has the right to make strategies to prepare the company's 
financial statements so that they are correctly presented.  
The managers often manipulate when reporting the company's condition to 
shareholders so that the goal of obtaining compensation can be achieved. The 
company's condition written by the manager is not appropriate or does not reflect 
the company's actual state because of the difference in the information held 
between managers and shareholders. Managers know more about the existing 
conditions in the company than the shareholders, thus creating information 
asymmetry (Daniel et al., 1998; White et al., 2010). 
Agency theory can be used as a basis for understanding the practice of risk 
disclosure (Diamond, 1985). Managers as agents have more and more accurate 
company information than stakeholders. This information covers all company 
conditions, including conditions that the company may face in the future. 
Shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders need this information as a basis for 
decision-making. In addition, the practice of risk disclosure is also able to avoid 




the control carried out by the principal to the agent by looking at the extent to 
which the agent carries out risk management disclosure (Borghei-Ghomi & Leung, 
2013). 
Based on the practice of risk disclosure, agency theory explains how 
managers provide information about risk to shareholders or creditors by giving 
accurate and reliable information. Managers, in this case, are internal parties of the 
company who know information about risks. In contrast, as external parties of the 
company, shareholders or creditors usually do not have information about risks 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The availability of reliable, accurate information 
related to risk from managers to shareholders or creditors will reduce the problem 
of information asymmetry (White et al., 2010). 
Profitability Interaction 
Profitability describes the level of effectiveness of operational activities that 
can be achieved by the company (Almazari, 2013). If the company's profitability 
is low, the auditor will carry out his audit duties more carefully because there is 
a higher business risk that will slow down the audit process and cause the 
issuance of a longer audited report (Maliah et al., 2015; Whiting & Woodcock, 
2011). Based on the description above, the hypotheses that can be formulated are: 
H1: Profitability has a positive effect on Audit Delay 
H2: Profitability has a positive impact on RMD 
H3: There is an indirect relationship between profitability and audit delay 
Leverage Interaction 
Leverage is the company's ability to meet its obligations (Tang & Luo, 2016). 
If the company has high leverage, the risk of the company's loss increases. 
Therefore, to gain confidence in the company's financial statements, the auditor 
will increase caution so that the audit delay range will be more extended 
(Sulaiman et al., 2015). Leverage has a positive effect on audit delay, which means 
that if the leverage is high, the auditor must collect more competent evidence to 
ensure the fairness of the financial statements (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Iatridis, 
2011). 
Companies with significant debt levels are more speculative and riskier 
because external parties who provide capital loans will hold the company 
accordingly. Creditors as capital borrowers will continue to control and need 
more information about the company's financial condition to be used as a 
creditor's benchmark for company obligations. The company responds to 
creditors by conducting more risk management disclosures (Davis et al., 1997; 
Gibson, 2012), as leverage positively affects risk management disclosure. 
However, the researchers found that leverage does not affect the extent of risk 
management disclosure (Tang & Luo, 2012). Based on this explanation, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
H4: Leverage has a positive effect on audit delay 
H5. Leverage increases risk management disclosure opportunities 
H6: It is suspected that leverage has a positive effect on risk management disclosure in 
indirect relationships 
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Audit Delay and Risk Management Disclosure 
Audit Delay is the time difference between the date of the financial 
statements and the audit opinion in the financial statements indicating the length 
of time the auditor has completed the audit (Sterman et al., 2007). Audit delay is 
the length of time for the completion of the audit carried out by the auditor as 
measured by the time difference between the date of the financial statements and 
the date of the audit opinion in the financial reports (Al Mamun et al., 2020). 
Audit delay harms stock prices. The longer the delay in publishing the audited 
annual financial statements, the potential for economic uncertainty expected by 
the market will be (Astuti et al., 2020). Based on the description above, the 
hypotheses that can be formulated are: 
H7: Audit delay affects risk management disclosure 
Moderating effect of Managerial Ownership to Risk Management Disclosure 
According to Jensen and Mecling (1976), the difference in interests between 
management and shareholders can be minimized by increasing managerial 
shares. The higher the managerial ownership in the company, the greater the 
management responsibility in making decisions and the more risk management 
disclosures (Majid et al., 2019). It is critical that risk management information 
creates a conducive environment for investment decision-making (Abdullah et 
al., 2017; Larasati & Asrori, 2020; Nasution et al., 2020) and provides ground for 
hypothetical formulation. 
H8: It is suspected that managerial ownership harms risk management disclosure 
METHODOLOGY   
Design 
This research approaches the investigated problems quantitatively. An 
explanatory design with an inferential statistic is provided to answers the 
presented hypotheses. This design offers five investigated variables in direct and 
indirect relationships. Two constructs serve as the exogenous predictor, i.e., 
profitability and leverage. Two other variables are audit delay and risk 
management disclosure (RMD), which are endogenous variables. This study also 
investigates the role of managerial ownership as the moderating variable 
between audit delay and RMD.  
This investigation employs partial-least-square structural-equation-
modeling (PLS-SEM) with Smartpls 3 software as the statistical tool to present 
the inner and outer model construction in the model. This technique will display 
outer and inner model quality assessment. The outer model serves as the 
presentation of the data quality in terms of their loading, Cronbach’s alpha, 
composite reliability, rho-a, and average variance extractor (AVE) as the 
convergent validity requirement. This outer scenario also reveals the 
discriminant validity of the data by employing the Heterotrait-Monotrait 




model presentation of the proposed hypotheses is revealed. The internal model 
qualities are present in Tables 2 and 4, while the outer model is in table 4.  
Measures 
All investigated variables present the data from the financial report of each 
firm. Financial ratios comprise the variables like leverage, as measured by debt 
to asset ratio (DAR) dan debt to equity ratio (DER). The profitability is observable 
from the net profit margin (NPM) and the return on equity (ROE). The audit 
delay is the lag time between the accomplishment of the audit and the published 
report. The risk management disclosure is adapted from the paperwork of the 
COSO 2017, representing the data availability in 108 objects of interest. The ratio 
compares the disclosed information and the total number of measurements. All 
data is sufficient in terms of the data quality information. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive information of the data.s 
Table 1. Descriptive Information 
 
Measures Mean St.Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 DAR 0.351 0.199 1.000 
       
2 DER 0.797 0.962 0.822 1.000 
      
3 ROE 0.042 0.124 -0.17 -0.486 1.000 
     
4 NPM 0.124 0.734 -0.305 -0.487 0.738 1.000 
    
5 AD 0.714 0.224 -0.147 -0.02 -0.314 -0.271 1.000 
   
6 Ownership 0.439 0.255 0.019 0.034 -0.006 0.075 0.002 1.000 
  
7 Pub.Own 0.352 0.176 0.08 -0.057 0.293 0.219 -0.303 -0.085 1.000 
 
8 RMD 0.662 0.236 0.055 -0.018 0.2 0.178 -0.3 -0.027 0.699 1.000 
9 Firm Size 20.681 5.653 -0.025 0.076 -0.024 -0.079 0.104 -0.027 -0.006 0.051 
Source: Adapted Smartpls output 
RESULTS 
Inner Model Evaluation 
The first stage in conducting the SEM-PLS test is analyzing an internal 
consistency reliability test or construct validity and reliability test. Table 2 
describes all the data obtained in this study. 
 
Table 2. Inner Model Validity and Reliability 
Variable Indicator Loading Alpha rho_A CR AVE VIF 
Profitability 
NPM 0.922 
1 0.861 0.93 0.869 
2.197 
ROE 0.942 2.197 
Leverage 
DAR 0.999 
1 8.802 0.923 0.857 
3.081 
DER 0.846 3.081 
Audit Delay AD 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Man.Owner MO 1.081 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 RMD 1.000 
    1.000 
 Source: Adapted Smartpls output 
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Convergent validity is the first stage to evaluate the outer model seen from 
the loading factor value. According to Hair et al. (2010), in conducting research, 
the loading factor measurement scale is 0.7. Therefore, this study will use a 
loading factor limit of 0.7. Based on the modification table above, it can be seen 
that all loading factors have values above 0.70, so that no constructs for all 
variables have been eliminated from the model. Convergent validity is also seen 
through AVE (Average Variance Extracted). They also suggest that if a model has 
an AVE value above 0.5, it is categorized as having high convergent validity. The 
AVE value of each construct in the model is concluded that AVE value is above 
0.5. These results indicate that this research data has met the requirements of both 
convergent validities (convergent validity). The combination of the assessment 
of the outer loading and the AVE (average variance extracted) test indicates that 
this research is convergent valid and meets the requirements to proceed to the 
next stage, namely the discriminant validity test as in table 3. 
Table 3. HTMT Test 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Audit Delay      
2 Leverage 0.092     
3 Moderating Effect 0.124 0.115    
4 Ownership Proportion 0.002 0.029 0.455   
5 Profitability 0.341 0.465 0.175 0.047  
6 Risk Man. Disclosure 0.3 0.04 0.28 0.027 0 
  Source: Adapted Smartpls output 
Discriminant validity is carried out to determine whether the variables or 
indicators in the research have a unique value related to the variables only. The 
results score the HTMT tests are below 0.9, thus confirming the acceptance of the 
overall feasibility of the model. After all model qualities pass, the path analysis 
can be carried out, as shown in table 4.  
Table 4. Inner Model Relationship Summary 
Relationships Effect T-value P-value 
Profitability -> Audit Delay -0.382 3.134 0.002 
Profitability -> RMD 0.116 1.028 0.305 
Profitability-> Audit Delay -> RMD 0.08 1.552 0.121 
Leverage -> Audit Delay -0.243 2.930 0.004 
Leverage -> RMD 0.089 0.97 0.332 
Leverage -> Audit Delay -> RMD 0.051 1.548 0.122 
Audit Delay -> RMD -0.21 2.011 0.045 
Audit Delay Mod.Effect -> RMD 0.303 5.070 0.000 
R2 to Audit Delay  0.154  
R2 to Risk Management Disclosure  0.188  




 Testing the statistics of this study gave some interesting results. 
Profitability has a negative direct effect on audit delay but not on RMD. 
Therefore, an indirect relationship cannot be proven. On the other hand, leverage 
also negatively impacts audit delay, but not on RMD and an indirect connection. 
Audit delay was found to harm RMD. Managerial ownership significantly plays 
a moderating role in the relationship between audit delay and RMD, indicating 
strengthening the relationship between the two variables. The entire context of 
the findings of this study is shown in figure 1 and will be discussed further in the 
discussion section. 
 
Figure 1. The Significance Test Revelation 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study provide partial acceptance of the proposed 
hypothesis formulation where profitability affects audit delay, but not on risk 
management disclosure (RMD) and the indirect relationship. Profitability 
information is necessary for investors because profitability is related to the 
company's stock price and dividends (Doraisamy et al., 2011). Data can be obtained 
about the profit from the investment invested (Galani et al., 2011). Every investor 
must pay attention when investing. That's why the company's profitability ratio is 
used to measure how much the company's ability to make a profit. 
Investors are attracted to invest in the capital market because of the 
disclosure of information (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). One of the information 
needed in the capital market is the company's financial statements, which contain 
the company's net income(Albanese, R., Dacin, M.T., Harris, 1997). Investors use 
these financial statements in assessing the performance of companies that go 
public. The net income information obtained can be used as a basis for determining 
how much the return on investment is made or how much earnings are obtained 
from each share purchased by investors (Barth et al., 2008). 
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The leverage variable empirically has a negative and significant effect on 
audit delay but does not affect RMD, and there is no indirect relationship between 
the three variables. The path coefficient values found between the two variables 
were statistically significant as the higher the level of leverage, the company will 
usually be riskier (Elshandidy et al., 2013). The creditors need transparency in 
financial reporting and accountability for using funds that have been lent as a 
benchmark in repaying debt (Arakcheev et al., 2011). Agency theory expressed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) reveals that companies with a high level of leverage 
will disclose more risk information to reduce agency costs and convince creditors 
can meet their obligations (Frank & Goyal, 2007; Patel & Chrisman, 2014).  
The results of this study are supported by previous researchers that leverage 
has a significant effect on risk management disclosure (Diamond, 1985; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013). Leverage is a ratio that shows the percentage of funds provided by 
shareholders to lenders or assesses the amount of debt used by the company. 
Creditors in companies with a high level of leverage will encourage management 
to disclose further information related to risk. Signal theory asserts that the 
company will provide information to creditors about any risks faced by the 
company. That creditors know the extent of the company's ability to fulfill its 
obligations (Jia et al., 2019), supporting agency theory which says that companies 
with high levels of leverage will disclose more risk information to reduce agency 
costs (Frank & Goyal, 2007). Managers also tend to provide more details related to 
risk management to send a good signal to creditors regarding the company's 
ability to meet its obligations (Kurniansyah et al., 2021). 
As the presentation of information regarding the timeliness of audit results, 
audit delay is an essential condition in disclosing organizational risk. This study 
confirms the results of the statistical analysis on hypothesis 7 regarding the 
relationship between the two variables. The negative relationship proves that the 
longer the company delays reporting the audit results, the lower the potential for 
business risk disclosure (Bae & Woo, 2015). This finding indicates the potential for 
closing valuable public information, which is seen as reducing the interest of 
potential investors to buy shares in related companies. Audit and disclosure delays 
are interrelated elements, and therefore delays in either process will give investors 
a lousy signal, as signalling theory suggests. This finding highlights the 
underrepresented issue in the auditing delay quality and risk management 
disclosure as to the author’s knowledge. 
Jakarta Islamic Index companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have 
leverage levels that continue to increase every year, although the increase is low. 
However, the size of the company's debt still affects the risk management 
disclosure because creditors need accountability from the company for the funds 
that have been used as a measuring tool to determine the company's ability to 
repay debt. Transparent risk disclosure will reduce agency costs between creditors 
as capital borrowers and companies as capital managers. The results show that 
managerial ownership has a negative and insignificant effect on risk management 
disclosure. This relationship between the two variables is thought to have no 




companies is low, and some do not have executive shares. The common 
managerial share ownership in the Jakarta Islamic Index company makes it 
possible that management does not have full authority to determine a decision and 
affect the level of risk management disclosure because the majority owner controls 
many policies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that the higher the managerial 
share ownership, the more risk management disclosure. Agency theory also 
assumes that management has two roles, namely as shareholders and as company 
managers. It can reduce conflicts of interest that occur between agents and 
principals, the emergence of agency problems between agents and principals as 
rational parties trying to defend their interests causes them to do moral hazard to 
protect each other's interests (Hellwig, 2009; M. Jensen, 2001; M. C. Jensen & 
Meckling, 1994; Kay, 2018).  
This study found that managerial ownership does not significantly affect risk 
management disclosure by applying the application of managerial shares to assist 
the interests of managers and shareholders. In carrying out risk management 
disclosure, business activities at companies in Indonesia have not been fully 
effective (Nasution et al., 2020). Management has a dual role, namely as executor 
of the company and shareholders, which does not impact risk management 
disclosure (Davis et al., 1997). Management acts as the executor of the company 
has known the risks faced by the company even though it is not disclosed in its 
financial statements. Management will also take into account the costs that will be 
incurred from the disclosure. Because they already know the information, it is 
deemed necessary to re-disclose it in the financial statements.  
This study increases the presentation of the paper by testing the effect of 
managerial ownership to moderate the audit delay and RMD. This study finds 
strong supporting evidence to this hypothesis, as a positive relation is discovered. 
This result provides another consideration when interpreting the interaction 
between the two variables. As to the author's knowledge, this moderating 
mechanism is still elusive in the academic debate; thus, our paper signifies the 
importance of considering this interrelated preposition. This argument stands that 
absolute ownership will lead the transformation of firms toward the expected 
route in defining strategic management (Kump et al., 2019; Ponciano & Amaral, 
2021). 
FURTHER STUDY 
 While our study shed light on several critical pieces of information in the 
capital market, it certainly comes with significant shortages. The measurement of 
RMD is revealed from the author’s reading in the current progress of the 
disclosure in the firms; however, it may create a bias in the evaluation. A 
continuous assessment from multiple stakeholders may benefit the reliability 
and robustness of the data. This study also may get a significant increase in the 
quality by expanding the data across the stock market in the region, either in 
south east asia or other developing areas, serving as a portrayal of firms’ 
openness in each political dynamic. We leave this to future researches.  
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